U.S. Justice Department Files Sexual Harassment Lawsuit Against Scotland County Agency and Employees

Earlier this month the United Sates Justice Department filed a sexual harassment lawsuit against Southeastern Community and Family Services, Inc., which is a public housing agency that administers the federal Section 8 voucher program in Scotland County.  The complaint, copied here, also names as defendants John Wesley, the Section 8 housing coordinator, and Eric Pender, a housing inspector. 

Generally, the complaint alleges that Wesley and Pender subjected voucher program participants and applicants to unwanted sexual comments, sexual touching and other sexual acts, and even conditioned or offered Section 8 benefits in exchange for sexual acts.  The complaint also alleges that the men punished women who rebuffed their sexual advances by taking adverse housing actions against them.  The claims are pursued under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Fair Housing Act.

According to the complaint, Wesley's harassment dates back to the year 2000 and includes such acts as making unwelcome comments and sexual advances to applicants, touching applicants and himself (in their presence) in a sexual manner, and even exposing his genitals in the presence of Section 8 applicants and participants.  He is also alleged to have used the women's responses to his sexual advances as a basis for advancing or hindering applications for benefits.  Similar misconduct is alleged against Pender.  In these ways the complaint alleges sexual harassment of both the hostile work environment and quid pro quo varieties, albeit outside of the employer-employee relationship.

The action is notable in several respects.  First, it serves as a reminder of the kinds of comments and actions that frequently lead to sexual harassment litigation.  In addition, it confirms that sexual harassment presents a liability risk for employers not only as to employee victims, but also as to third-parties who are affected by the misconduct. The case also serves as a reminder that governmental entities are not immune from liability for sexual harassment.  Finally, we see that sexual harassment is prohibited not only by Title VII but by other federal laws prohibiting discrimination and that federal agencies other than the EEOC enforce the prohibition against sexual harassment.

N.C. Supreme Court Concludes Injured School Employee Failed to Satisfy Heightened Willfulness Standard Under Exception to Worker’s Compensation Exclusivity Rule

As discussed in our last post, the North Carolina Supreme Court, in its recent Trivette v. Yount opinion, ruled that a Caldwell County public school employee stated a valid negligence cause of action against her school’s principal for an injury suffered on the job.  In so ruling, the Court concluded that the employee’s claim was not barred by the exclusivity provision of North Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act because the relationship between the employee and the school’s principal was one of co-workers rather than one of employee-employer.  Consequently, the claim against the principal qualified for the  Pleasant exclusivity exception, which allows plaintiffs to pursue negligence claims against co-workers for injuries resulting from willful, wanton, and reckless negligence.

After making this initial determination, the Supreme Court considered the defendant’s second, alternative argument.  Specifically, the defendant argued that the plaintiff’s claim, even if allowed to circumvent the exclusivity argument, still failed as a matter of law because the principal’s alleged conduct simply did not rise to the level of willful, wanton, and reckless conduct.  Under this alternative argument, the defendant moved for a summary judgment in its favor.  The trial court denied this motion, finding that disputed issues of fact required a jury to decide the issue. 

After reviewing the facts of the case in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the Supreme Court agreed with the defendant’s position and determined that the trial court should have granted summary judgment.  The Supreme Court reversed the trial court on this basis.

In its analysis, the Court acknowledged evidence showing that the plaintiff was worried that a mishap with the fire extinguisher could trigger a relapse of her myasthenia gravis.  The Court further found evidence sufficient to suggest that the defendant was aware of this fear.   Nevertheless, the Court referred to precedents holding that even unquestionably negligent behavior rarely meets the high standard of willful, wanton, and reckless negligence.  The Court concluded that there was no evidence indicating that the fire extinguisher presented any danger, whether immediate or latent, while the record was silent as to whether the extinguisher contained any warning labels.  The Court then concluded that even if the defendant knew that an unexpected discharge would be “messy and unpleasant,” the evidence was still insufficient to support an inference that the defendant was willfully, wantonly, or recklessly negligent, or that he was manifestly indifferent to the consequences of an accidental outburst.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Trivette is something of a mixed bag for parties to negligence actions arising from work place injuries.  On the one hand, the opinion arguably broadens the scope of the Pleasant exception to Worker’s Compensation exclusivity by establishing that a school’s principal and administrative worker constitute co-workers for purposes of the exception.  At the same time, however, the opinion confirms the high level of proof necessary to establish willful, wanton, and reckless negligence under this exception.  Please feel free to contact me directly by email or at (336) 333-6388 to discuss this case law development or other North Carolina employment law issues. 

N.C. Supreme Court Clarifies Worker’s Compensation Exclusivity Exception in Negligence Action Brought against Public School Principal

In a December opinion, Trivette v. Yount, the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that a Caldwell County public school employee stated a valid negligence cause of action against her school’s principal for an injury suffered on the job.  In so ruling, the Court determined that the school’s principal and the subordinate employee constituted co-employees.  This relationship, the Court found, was not subject to the exclusivity provision of North Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act – even though the injury occurred on the job and even though the plaintiff was simultaneously pursing a workers’ compensation claim before the North Carolina Industrial Commission.   

The facts of the case are somewhat bizarre.  The plaintiff testified that a student had pulled the safety pin from a fire extinguisher and sprayed it in a classroom.  The extinguisher was then brought to the area where the plaintiff’s desk and the principal’s office were located.  The next day, the principal placed the extinguisher on the corner of the plaintiff’s desk.  After the plaintiff asked the principal to remove the extinguisher and replace its safety pin, the principal allegedly scoffed and continued “playing” with the extinguisher while joking around with another secretary.  The extinguisher then discharged, causing a fine powdery mist to land on the plaintiff.  The plaintiff alleged that the substance aggravated her myasthenia gravis, a pre-existing medical condition that had been in remission.  She filed a claim with the North Carolina Industrial Commission seeking workers’ compensation benefits and also filed a separate lawsuit against the principal for additional damages.  Her husband joined in the lawsuit with a claim of his own for loss of consortium.

The defendant-principal moved to dismiss the lawsuit on grounds that North Carolina’s Workers’ Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy for the plaintiff’s claim.  The defendant alternatively moved for summary judgment on grounds that the alleged conduct did not rise to a sufficient level of culpability even if the exclusivity provision did not bar the claim.

In opposing the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff argued that her suit was permissible under an exception to the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act.  That exception, known as the Pleasant exception, allows an injured worker to sue a co-employee for “intentional injuries,” a term defined to include injuries resulting from willful, wanton, and reckless negligence. 

In assessing whether the plaintiff’s action could fall within the Pleasant exception, the critical issue was whether the school principal constituted the plaintiff’s co-worker.  The Pleasant exception would allow the action if he was a co-worker.  If, on the other hand, the principal were deemed the plaintiff’s employer, rather than a co-worker, the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act would preclude the action. 

In order to resolve the issue, the Court closely examined the nature of the working relationship between the two parties.  The Court recognized that the defendant, as school principal, was an agent of the school board.  The Court also agreed that the defendant-principal held supervisory authority over the plaintiff.  Neither fact, however, was determinative. 

Instead, the Court turned to N.C.G.S. § 115C-276(j), which indicates that every person employed in North Carolina’s public schools (other than charter schools) is an employee of the local board of education.  On this basis, the Court concluded that the defendant-principal and the plaintiff were both employees of the Caldwell County Board of Education.  Consequently, the Court affirmed the lower courts’ determination that the plaintiff stated a permissible cause of action under the Pleasant exception to worker’s compensation exclusivity.

In further support of its opinion, the Supreme Court also approved of several North Carolina Court of Appeals decisions, which have previously held that supervisors and those they supervise should be treated as co-employees under the Workers’ Compensation Act.  By aligning itself with these cases, the North Carolina Supreme Court leaves no question that supervisors, in cases of willful, wanton, or reckless negligence, can be sued for work place injuries despite the availability of workers’ compensation benefits.

As noted earlier, the defendant also moved for summary judgment on grounds that his alleged misconduct did not arise to a sufficient level of culpability to support a liability finding under Pleasant in any event.   Please return soon for discussion of the outcome of this separate, but equally important North Carolina employment law ruling.

Fourth Circuit Finds Plaintiff’s Allegations of Sexual Harrassment Sufficient to State a Claim for Relief

On December 1, 2012, in the case of Sheila Davis v. City of Charlottesville School Board, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals (the Circuit with jurisdiction over North Carolina's federal courts) vacated a District Court’s dismissal of a sexual harassment complaint filed by Sheila Davis against the City of Charlottesville School Board.  Presently, only the slip opinion is available; click here to view the slip opinion.

As the opinion explains, in order to establish a claim for coworker sexual harassment under federal law, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the conduct was unwelcome, that it was based on gender, that it “was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment and create an abusive work environment,” and that it is “imputable to her employer.” See, e.g., Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc., 335 F.3d 325, 331 (4th Cir. 2003).

Ms. Davis alleged that she was the subject of an attempted sexual assault by a coworker and that she immediately reported the incident to a supervisor. She alleged that she then suffered an unwanted intimate touching by the same coworker the very next day. The district court concluded that Ms. Davis had not alleged any facts that would entitle her to relief and dismissed her complaint. The Fourth Circuit disagreed. It found that the facts alleged by Davis, including the physical nature of the harassment, stated a plausible claim that the assault was “sufficiently severe or pervasive” to survive dismissal. Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit held that Ms. Davis sufficiently alleged facts that could demonstrate liability on behalf of her employer, since she immediately reported the harassment and the harassment occurred again thereafter.

In sum, the Fourth Circuit held that Ms. Davis’s original complaint was sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief, and the district court’s judgment was reversed and remanded. The opinion is notable inasmuch as it confirms that even misconduct that is limited in frequency can suffice to establish a sexual harassment claim when the conduct is severe in nature.

The Davis case reaffirms the difficulties posed by allegations of workplace sexual misconduct.  Even in traditionally conservative federal circuits, when sexual misconduct is alleged to have recurred after reporting, such cases will almost surely reach a jury for final determination. If you are confronting issues of work place harassment, it is important to speak with experienced North Carolina employment lawyers. Please feel free to contact me directly at (336) 333-6375 to discuss the case or other North Carolina employment law matters.  For more information about my Greensboro law firm of Sharpless & Stavola, please visit our website at www.sharpless-stavola.com.