The case was filed by Charles Lee, a rail carman for Norfolk
Southern in North Carolina. As a carman,
Lee was responsible for inspecting rail cars for potential safety
concerns. In July of 2011, the company
suspended Lee without pay for six months.
The company claimed that the suspension was because Lee drank a beer while
on duty and then drove a company owned car in violation of company policy.
Lee, however, claimed that his termination was actually due
to two illegal factors: (1) his race (black) and (2) retaliation for federal
rail safety whistleblowing activity.
Lee filed two separate lawsuits at different times alleging
these different theories. The district
court entered summary judgment for the defendant and dismissed the first
lawsuit for alleged race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §
1981. Shortly thereafter, Lee filed a
second lawsuit for damages under the Federal Railroad Safety Act’s
whistleblower provision. In this suit,
Lee contended that Norfolk Southern suspended him in retaliation for his
refusal to comply with the company’s attempts to limit the number of defective
cars that he could identify as needing repairs.
In short, Lee argued that the company unlawfully punished him for
blowing the whistle on safety violations.
Norfolk Southern argued that this second lawsuit was barred
by an election of remedies restriction contained in the
Federal Railroad Safety Act.
That provision states: “An employee
may not seek protection under both this section and another provision of law
for the same allegedly unlawful act of the railroad carrier.”
49 U.S.C. §20109(f).
The district court agreed with this position
and granted summary judgment in the second suit as well.
In a heavily contested appeal, which featured appearances
by government agencies and amicus filings by the
Association of American Railroads, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.
In so doing, the Court agreed with Lee’s
position that while his suspension was the challenged act in both lawsuits, the
allegedly unlawful act was different in the two suits.
The first suit alleged discrimination as the
unlawful act; the second suit alleged whistleblower retaliation. Because these
are distinct causes of action with different proof requirements, the Court
ruled that the election of remedies restriction did not bar the second whistleblower
action.
Procedurally, the case was quite complex. The complexity was due to a number of
factors, which included the rigorous administrative scheme that a railroad
worker must first pursue before filing a whistleblower case in court. The case demonstrates well, however, the
basic danger that lurks whenever an employer takes adverse employment action
against an employee who has reported or opposed safety violations or who has refused to comply
with instructions or orders that violate federal safety standards.
Far from unique to the railroad setting, whistleblower
protections exist in a myriad of settings, both blue collar and white
collar. Virtually any time an employee
is punished for opposing work place safety concerns, whistleblower
considerations arise. Beyond the safety arena, employees are also protected from retaliation for opposing unlawful activities, such as employment discrimination or harassment.
Another whistleblower protection that often comes in to play is the protection afforded to employees who
report or oppose unlawful billing practices by employers who perform work under government contracts. Both federal and state law provides protections to whistleblowers who report false claims for payment or reimbursements. This
blog post presents an excellent overview of some of the more common whistleblower statutory protections under federal law, but keep in mind that North Carolina law provides many others.
It is also critical to remember that retaliation or whistleblower actions often prove more problematic to the employer than defending the underlying claim of unlawful conduct. In this case, for example, the Fourth Circuit noted that the “burden-shifting framework that is applicable to
FRSA cases is much easier for a plaintiff to satisfy than the McDonnell Douglas standard”
applicable to Section 1981 claims.
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